Colonies (nos): s'attrister quand on en parle.
period.
11 This paper is an effort to explore the course of French debates over empire from the period of Napoleon through the July Monarchy -the broader context for the thought of the iconic liberal republicans Constant and Tocqueville -with particular attention to the ways in which liberal and republican registers were deployed in both support and critique of empire, and to how the articulation of liberal and republican agendas in France was affected by the Algeria conquest.
The first decade of the subjugation of Algeria marked a critical moment in French liberalism's evolving relation to empire. When France captured the city of Algiers from its Ottoman rulers in 1830, the elements of a thoroughgoing liberal critique of French imperial expansion were available: Benjamin Constant and other liberal republicans under Napoleon's empire and the Bourbon restoration had continued a tradition of thought, stretching back to the pre-Revolutionary Enlightenment, that held that liberty and empire were incompatible, that conquest could only be accomplished with barbarous levels of violence unbecoming a modern nation, and that the right of peoples to independence and self-government was universal. Not only was principled criticism of the Algeria conquest muted, however, but the languages of both liberalism and republicanism were invoked more often in support of the conquest than against it. As in so many areas of domestic policy, the liberals who came to power under the July Monarchy failed to live up to the promise of their opposition politics under the Restoration. 12 What criticism there was of the conquest was almost entirely restricted to 11 See Ira Katznelson and Andeas Kalyvas, Liberal beginnings: making a republic for the moderns (Cambridge, 2008) , and Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics after the Terror: The republican origins of French liberalism (Ithaca, 2008 claims, made by liberal political economists during the conquest's earliest phase, that the national interest lay in free trade rather than in conquest and colonization. These arguments soon caved before the embrace of a new colonial mission by most thinkers from the left and liberal center, most prominently Alexis de Tocqueville.
The sputtering and then quick extinction, during the liberal July Monarchy, of a critique of imperial expansion among the putative heirs of Diderot and Constant was due in part to the longstanding anxiety among French liberals and progressives about France's international stature. 13 During the Revolution, political discourse had been inflected with a sense of entitlement to empire that stemmed from memories of France's earlier status as a great colonial power and from the desire to erase the long history of defeat by Britain that stretched back to the loss of the bulk of French colonial territory in the New World and India at the end of the Seven Years' War. Debate about overseas colonies was muted, though the Constitution of the Year III (promulgated after the emancipation of the West Indian slaves) declared the French colonies to be "integral parts of the Republic," subject to the same constitutional law. 14 But as Andrew Jainchill has recently shown, the years between the Terror and the rise of Napoleon witnessed an impassioned debate, carried on in republican terms, about whether expansion into contiguous European territory was justifiable and advisable. Jainchill argues that during the Revolution critics of expansion, such as Robespierre, tended to argue from classical republicans premises that empire threatens liberty, while advocates of annexation (of the Rhineland, the Austrian 13 Perhaps, too, to the odd timing of the conquest: while the liberals opposed Charles X's military expedition and might not have initiated it themselves, they inherited the conquest a few weeks later and were loath to give it up. Still, such a conquest had long been contemplated; see Ann Thomson, "Arguments for the conquest of Algiers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, " Maghreb Review (1989) Netherlands, and other territories) tended to the invoke "modern" republican argument that representative government made territorial expansion safe for republicanism, though he recognizes that Constant later made his iconic critique of conquest precisely in modern terms.
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But despite efforts by various revolutionary governments to restore the colonial empire and to extend France's boundaries within Europe, France ultimately lost further territory during the Revolution. 16 Napoleon, in addition to his spectacular and disastrous expansion across Europe and his Egyptian expedition, nursed aspirations of global hegemony even more ephemeral and illusory. The "colonial madness" under Napoleon (his own and his supporters') included projects, all failed, to recover the prosperous West-Indian sugar colonies, to retrieve "l'Inde française" (reduced since 1763 to five small outposts), and to acquire new colonies in Senegal, Madagascar, Java, and
Cochinchina. 17 Criticism in this period was stifled: Napoleon made it illegal, for instance, to publish abolitionist arguments after he reinstated slavery in the French colonies in 1802. 18 Occasional tracts published under Napoleon kept up a weak current of anti- desire to "conquer the world," "to acquire remote countries, the possession of which will add nothing to national prosperity," and he describes the conquering soldiers as "victims, the charge that the Haitian government was despotic, arguing that it had to be so because the slaves in Saint-Domingue had regarded their masters, who lived under a similarly despotic monarchy, as free, and so knew no better; and that in addition "they were not civilized enough to create for themselves a truly liberal government…They have done all they can for the moment; later they will do the rest" (57 he identified as the "spirit of conquest," which had reached its apogee in Napoleon's Empire but which, Constant believed, could be seen more broadly as a danger distinctive of post-revolutionary, indeed of all modern, politics. Though enthusiasm for Napoleonic militarism was, to be sure, at a low ebb when the work was published, Constant was sufficiently shrewd and farsighted to identify in advance many of the political and rhetorical strategies which the advocates of the Algerian conquest would use to sell that conquest to the French nation. show that commerce need not provoke wars of expansion and rivalry and that commercial nations could benefit by adopting a politics of mutual encouragement rather than militarized competition.
Constant, with his penchant for making moral arguments in historical terms, often couched this dichotomy more deterministically, suggesting simply that commerce would "necessarily" replace war, that international commercial ties would make patriotism irrelevant and violence obsolete unless power-hungry men disrupted this natural course of events. 33 The essay thus seems to ignore commerce's role in sparking modern wars and imperial violence. But it also tells a more complicated story, for in insisting that the peaceful commercial spirit was a fragile achievement, and in detailing the ways in which modern governments co-opted their citizens for violent projects of expansion, Constant showed precisely that the spirit of conquest was far from obsolete. The essay suggests that modern self-interest may be seen to have moral value and moral purpose, but that persistent intimations that a moral direction to history can be perceived but that modern citizens must be prepared to struggle on its behalf. One of the July Monarchy's early symbolic gestures was its erection of an obelisk from the Luxor temple at the center of the Place de la Concorde, once home to the guillotine. 50 The Miroir sought to present to the French political imagination the idea of an independent Algeria that might take its place in a nineteenth-century Europe of emerging nationalities and engage with European states as a diplomatic equal.
The work indicates the critical possibilities of liberal discourse at a moment when liberalism was being marshaled in France and Britain in the service of empire. While sovereignty norms and membership in the international legal community were coming to everything, against the people itself, whose most generous passions are being excited. In time, it will be able to distinguish its true friends from its interested flatterers" (15 We have sent to their deaths on simple suspicion and without trial people whose guilt was always doubtful and then despoiled their heirs. We massacred people carrying [our] safe conducts, slaughtered on suspicion entire populations subsequently found to be innocent; we have put on trial men considered saints by the country, men revered because they had enough courage to expose themselves to our fury so that they could intervene on behalf of their unfortunate compatriots; judges were found to condemn them and civilized men to execute them. We have thrown into prison chiefs of tribes for offering hospitality to our deserters; we honor, the disinterested protection of the weak, humanity -do they not also have theirs?
62 Already in 1834, some defenders of the colony were insisting that Algeria was France.
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Lamartine, for one, pronounced the idea of giving up the colony a "fatal thought…an antinational, antisocial, antihuman thought." Lamartine's paean to national glory was echoed a few years later by another self-described liberal, Adolphe Thiers, president of the council and minister of foreign affairs, who excused the violence of the conquest as ordinary and inevitable: "I don't say that there will never be misfortunes, never mistakes, never excesses. What government could have the presumption to maintain that in using the means of war in foreign countries, everything will always be done wisely and humanely? That is impossible; we don't even accept such a condition for the defense of our borders. War is war."
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The republican Dictionnaire Politique of 1843, in its emphasis on France's great historic mission to colonize, epitomized the dominant leftist position on the conquest.
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The work's article "Colonie," written by the political economist Jean-Gustave CourcelleSeneuil, argued that although "we recognize the abuses of [our colonial] regime and believe that it demands radical reforms," the "need to colonize is no passing fantasy for a great and strong nation….Every people tends to develop itself not merely by a rapid growth in population, but by this instinctive sentiment of ambition and movement, which Declaring that "we make no pretension to return to the imperial system," he nonetheless denounced the "furor of denigration against everything that is greater, more useful, more patriotic." The speech betrays his anxiety that the regime was perceived as both too Bourbon and too Napoleonic. Concerns about the violence of the conquest were thus shared by critics and supporters of the colony. Defenders of the conquest, in appropriating these worries and pledging themselves to reform, disarmed such arguments as a basis for anticolonialism.
The legislator Gaëtan de La Rochefoucauld was among the most eloquent in denouncing the notorious 1832 massacre of the tribe of El Ouffia and the French failure to punish such excesses. But he used this critique to argue for his own plan of colonization, which would begin with legal pluralism and gradually work toward civilizing and converting the Algerians: "Would it not be the greatest and most glorious event for France, this mission she gives a young prince to bring about the revolution that is unfolding at this moment in Africa?" he asked. "France has, in Algiers, not a few military posts to occupy nor a few commercial relations to extend, but a whole continent to enlighten." The question of Africa will be set decidedly on the path toward a good and great solution only when…ministers fall or rise because of it. Then, the first minds of the country will be at its service, then the attention, the effort, the activity of men of state will turn that way. That moment has not altogether arrived, but it is very 69 Tocqueville's "Letters on Algeria" of 1837 strongly resemble La Rochefoucauld's position described above; his later invocation of national honor and arguments that a country like France could not retreat from Algeria without signaling its decline to the world echo the Lamartine speech just quoted. near. The sentiment of the chamber and of the government is already that Algeria is today our greatest affair. 70 Much of the recent literature on Tocqueville and Algeria has dwelled on the question of how his liberalism can be reconciled with his support for empire, and perhaps more pointedly with his clear-eyed support for the violent domination of native Algerians, even as he acknowledged that colonial rule more often barbarized than civilized its subjects. 71 I would suggest that the question should also be regarded as a broader question about the character of French liberalism at this formative moment. Tocqueville, though unique among his contemporaries in the philosophical and sociological richness of his liberalism, was strikingly in line with them in his judgments about conquest and colonization. Not having you along, I tried at least to make up for your absence by asking a lot of questions to do with that great side of the African affair that occupies you so much, the maintenance of the indigenous race in the face of our own. I brought back this general notion, that, for the rest, I already had: that it is not only cruel, but absurd and impracticable, to try to force back or exterminate the natives; but through what means could the two races really be brought into contact? I confess with sorrow that my mind is troubled and hesitates ....Whatever happens, we can be sure that our proximity will create a social revolution among the Arabs, with painful effects."
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Though unsettled by Corcelle's worries, he also seized with some bravado the ground of realism: "From the moment that we committed that great violence of conquest, I think that we should not recoil from the small acts of violence [violences de detail] that are absolutely necessary to consolidate it." 75 And "[t]he quarrel is no longer between governments, but between races….in order for us to colonize to any extent, we must necessarily use not only violent measures, but visibly iniquitous ones."
76
Although Tocqueville was both more nuanced in his analysis of the conquest's importance for France and more thoughtful about the costs of colonial violence than many of his contemporaries, he shared the widespread sense of imperial rivalry with Britain, the liberal-republican preoccupation with France's international standing as a great nation, and the willingness to carry out the conquest through the use of violence that would be considered unconscionable within Europe. And although his views, over two decades, about possible relations with native Algerians were more complex than those of many of his contemporaries, on this question he moved, with Guizot and others, rather 74 Letter to Corcelle, 1 December 1846, OC 15. p. 224. He also described the famine and "extreme misery" among the Arabs and added that "the hatred which reigns between the two races…is painful to see. This dual perspective of nation and empire, and a perception of the tensions between these political forms, is evident in debates and political texts at the time of the Algeria conquest, with regard to both France's status as a nation and the disputed "nationality" of the Algerians. The very notion of France as la grande nation in Napoleonic propaganda had united the idea of the French nation with that of imperial expansion within and outside Europe: "la grande nation is summoned to astonish and console the world," as Napoleon put it in a speech to the army in Italy in 1797. 86 Something of this idea was preserved in the thought of self-professed liberals during the Algeria conquest, as Lamartine's yearning for "colonial ubiquity" as the nation's proper destiny suggests.
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As for the Algerians' nationality, many conceded that there was an "Arab nationality"
in the loose sense of cultural or ethnic association, but it was widely denied that Algeria enjoyed the sort of affective or political coherence that might underpin existence as a 85 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 154-55. 86 Henry Laurens, "Bonaparte, l'Orient et la Grande Nation," in Annales de la Révolution française, no. 273 (July-September 1988), pp 289-301 at p. 297. Laurens argues that Napoleon adopted the expression from several Ottoman correspondents. Also see Jacques Godechot, La Grande Nation, l'expansion révolutionnaire de la France dans le monde de 1789 à 1799 (Paris, 1983) . 87 Also see the discussion in the article "Nation" by Elias Regnault (a lawyer and, after 1848, minister of finance), in the Dictionnaire Politique. The article argues both that nations require "material" and "moral unity" and a degree of homogeneity, and that smaller nations will likely be incorporated into "superior" nations, asking "Is there not something ridiculous in calling Belgium a nation?" It concludes that as humanity develops there will be a tendency toward ever greater concentrations, until "all humanity is but one single Nation" (625 
